To place Heidegger in context, thinking and poetry are forms of technopoeisis that prepares us for a sort of readiness to what universal technocomputation engenders unhampered on the level of scale. But Heidegger also says that technology is a donation of being. Suppose then that technopoetic subjects must also somehow be willing subjects of technocapital. Is this how we sustain recursivity that always threatens to de-synthesize the transcendental coding of technocomputation? To insert John Searle in this context, is this how we ought to surrender our semantic capability for interaction to the pure syntactic particularization or digitization of algorithms? I suppose that computation, arguing from Searle, and echoing Heidegger, is incapable of semantic interoperability.
What I guess Parisi lacks in her approriation of the late Heidegger is the latter’s compromise with the unfolding techne in the time of the last hinting of god. Not that it’s an actual god but a god that’s in every form of cybernetic computational Gestell, the framing of the world by representation, that is, a necessity that commands. Even so, it’s also hinting at a new donative form of being where we can forge an adequate relationship to technology. This, among others, is what drives Yuk Hui, whom Parisi mentioned, to forge a new semantic orientation towards Gestell, that is to say, the logic of recursivity that leads to cosmotechnical poiesis of sort concerning the irreducibility of contingency.